Bellarmine University

ScholarWorks@Bellarmine
Undergraduate Theses

Undergraduate Works

4-23-2021

The Financial Impact of Gender Diversity on Corporate Boards
Elizabeth Hamilton
ehamilton@bellarmine.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.bellarmine.edu/ugrad_theses
Part of the Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Commons

Recommended Citation
Hamilton, Elizabeth, "The Financial Impact of Gender Diversity on Corporate Boards" (2021).
Undergraduate Theses. 59.
https://scholarworks.bellarmine.edu/ugrad_theses/59

This Honors Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Undergraduate Works at
ScholarWorks@Bellarmine. It has been accepted for inclusion in Undergraduate Theses by an authorized
administrator of ScholarWorks@Bellarmine. For more information, please contact jstemmer@bellarmine.edu,
kpeers@bellarmine.edu.

The Financial Impact of Gender Diversity on Corporate Boards
Lizzie Hamilton
Advisor: Dr. Brad Stevenson
Readers: Dr. Patricia Selvy, Dr. Hongwei Song

Abstract
The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between gender diversity and
firm financial performance, using a data set of 50 S&P 500 companies during 2015-2019.
Gender diversity was measured through the percentage of women on the board and whether the
board has a “critical mass” (of at least three women). In the results of the regression analyses,
some significant relationships between variables were found. The regression between ROA and
the percentage of women indicated a positive, significant relationship for ROA to the percentage
of women. For the regression between ROA and the critical mass variable, no significant
relationship was established. The results indicate that a critical mass may not be necessary for
women to have a positive impact on a firm’s ROA. After trimming the data for outliers, a
positive relationship was found between ROE and the percentage of women on the board.
Consistent with other research, a positive relationship was also found between ROE and the
critical mass variable.
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1. Introduction
Over the recent years, women have made major strides in the corporate world. They have
had increasing participation in the labor force and higher education and begun holding more
corporate leadership positions at every level of an organization. An increasing number of
companies are also making efforts to improve in terms of gender diversity. However, when
considering one of the highest-ranking bodies of an organization, the board of directors, women
remain in the minority in holding this role worldwide. The board of directors serves in an
important position to guide the actions of a company, so as we see women make advances, this is
an important area where their leadership is lacking,
A company’s board of directors serves as a monitoring body over management with the
aim of protecting shareholder interests. They hold responsibility over many strategic decisions
for a company (Sarhan et al. 2019). The requirements related to the size of the board and
composition are specific to each firm, with differences amongst firms and industries. There are
some attributes that tend to be common criteria for the election of board members which include
“independence, integrity, a good professional and financial status,” with knowledge of the
industry, products, and consumers of the company, and the ability to make difficult decisions
(Chitimus 2014). While there is research to suggest that men and women exhibit behavioral
differences in the workplace (Chen et al., 2016), there is no evidence to suggest that women
would perform as inferior board members to men. Yet, there is still a great disparity in gender on
boards across the world.
According to the Spencer Stuart Board Index (2019) which draws data from S&P 500
boards, women made up 26% of all directors in 2019. This number has increased incrementally
every year for the past five years. In 2015, the percentage was just 20% (Spencer Stuart, 2015).
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Women not only remain in the minority, but they also tend to experience being the only woman
in many group settings. In 2019, 99% of boards had at least one woman director, but only around
90% have two or more (Spencer Stuart, 2019). The lack of gender diversity on boards has drawn
international discussion and controversy. This has led some countries to make attempts towards
the progression of more equal representation on boards. In some areas of the world, gender
quotas have been enacted to increase the number of women on boards. For example, in 2002, a
gender quota was legislated by the Norwegian government requiring women to make up at least
40% of boards of public limited-liability companies (Torchia et al. 2011). Other countries have
followed suit including Spain, Iceland, and France. In a different approach, Germany has
legislated voluntary participation which asks firms to “comply or explain” with
recommendations for diversity on boards (Joecks et al. 2012). In 2018, the United States saw its
first gender mandate for boards with the passage of California Senate Bill No. 826 (Greene et al.
2020).
Clearly, the composition of boards is shifting and will continue to. This raises the
question of what impact women have as board members. There are many ways in which this can
be measured, so the following paper aims to explore the financial effect of greater gender
diversity. Much of the current literature on the topic focuses on countries that have taken a more
progressive approach toward requiring gender diversity on boards. This study will look at the
boards of large-cap firms in the United States using recent data to investigate the relationship
between varying levels of gender diversity and firm financial performance.
2. Literature Review
Numerous studies have been conducted to study the impacts of gender diversity on board
of directors. Adams and Ferreira (2009) find that gender diversity has significant effects on
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board governance. Female directors tend to have fewer attendance problems and positively
influence the attendance behavior of male directors as well. They also find that boards with
greater gender diversity tend to have more board meetings. Their research suggests that female
board members appear to be tougher monitors (Adams & Ferreira, 2009). Assuming that women
serve as tougher monitors, Nguyen (2019) hypothesizes that board gender diversity may also be
correlated with a lower cost of equity for firms. This research, using a sample of French firms,
finds that the proportion of women directors is negatively correlated with cost of equity
(Nguyen, 2019). This result is significant because it suggests that investors may have greater
confidence in boards with women serving on them which would lower the firm’s riskiness. This
could also lead the firm to improved financial performance.
Consistent with the evidence that women serve as better monitors on boards, Chen et al.
(2016) find that boards with a greater proportion of female directors are also less likely to have
internal control weaknesses. Further, the presence of women reduces the occurrence of internal
control issues even when they do not serve on the audit committee (Chen et al., 2016). These
results suggest that the presence of women on boards leads to greater effectiveness considering
the important role of effective internal controls. Research by Saona et al. (2019) provides further
evidence to support the idea that women directors lead to more effective boards. This study finds
through a sample of European firms that more gender diverse boards help mitigate earnings
management practices (Saona et al., 2019). The role of the board of directors is important in
monitoring management and preventing opportunistic behavior. This research demonstrates
further the potential value women can provide for boards.
Another possible benefit gender diversity can provide to boards is reducing groupthink,
“the failure of board members to consider alternatives to the dominant view when making
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decisions” (Kamalnath, 2017). Kamalnath (2017) finds evidence which suggests that when
female directors are independent and considered “outsiders,” they can help serve as a remedy to
groupthink. Female directors often tend to be independent, or not having a relationship with the
company except as a director. This research suggests that boards would improve decision making
abilities with the presence of female, independent directors. This also could have impacts on the
firm’s performance.
2.a Financial Performance
Considering the research mentioned, a business case can be made for the inclusion of
women on boards. In particular, women on boards could contribute to improved financial
performance for firms. This study aims to determine the relationship between the number of
women on boards and the financial performance of firms. There are several studies that have
looked at this relationship. However, the results are controversial. This may be due to a variety
of reasons which will be discussed below.
2.a.1 Positive Relationships
There are several studies which find a positive relationship between financial
performance and gender diversity on boards. Erhardt et al. (2003) find that board diversity, both
ethnic and gender, is positively associated with financial performance. In this study financial
performance is measured by return on asset (ROA) and investment (ROI). Firm data is collected
from 1993 to 1998 and is for 117 large US companies. This research does not look exclusively at
gender diversity, so when controlling for other forms of diversity, results could vary. Also, since
the data used is over twenty years old, and board composition has shifted in terms of diversity,
current research could also find different results.
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In another study, Carter et al. (2010) analyze the relationship between gender diversity on
the board and financial performance as measured by Tobin’s Q. The sample used includes data
from all Fortune 500 firms for the period 1998-2002. The results show that there is a positive
relationship between board gender diversity and financial performance. In particular, the
evidence shows that this is primarily through the audit function of the board. This study chooses
a different measure for financial performance than Erhardt et al. (2003), but it still yields similar
results. It also is slightly more recent, but still dated considering the changing demographics of
many boards. Further research with more current data would allow for more insights into how
this relationship may have shifted as the composition of boards has shifted.
2.a.2 Negative Relationships
In contrast, further research shows a negative correlation between board gender diversity
and firm financial performance. In one study, Vemala et al. (2018) examine a sample of S&P
500 firms from 2000 to 2011. This research is more current and considers both Tobin’s Q and
accounting ratios including return on assets and equity (ROE). The results of the analysis find
that there is a negative correlation between gender diversity and the firm’s Tobin’s Q ratio and
ROA. However, there is a positive correlation when looking at ROE. This data is almost a
decade old, but more recent than the studies mentioned previously. The more recent data could
explain the varying results, and the longer time period used could also play a factor. Perhaps, the
presence of female directors leads to short-term changes that do not last in the longer term. It
also uses multiple measures of financial performance.
Another study conducted by Daunfeldt and Rudholm (2012) examines the same question
but using companies listed in Sweden from 1997 to 2005. They find that more gender diverse
boards tend to lead to lower returns on assets after two years (Daunfeldt & Rudholm, 2012). This
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study uses a large data set of 20,487 companies of varying sizes rather than just large companies
like much of the other research. Daunfeldt and Rudholm (2012) argue that large, successful firms
may be more likely to choose women for their boards which could explain finding a positive
relationship to financial performance. There also may be a stronger push from stakeholders of
larger companies to have more diverse boards than for smaller ones. Rather than the presence of
women on the boards leading to higher returns, the reverse of this may be true (Daunfeldt &
Rudholm, 2012). Additionally, since this study uses Swedish data, variances could be due to
cultural differences between the countries which could impact the acceptance of women on the
boards and how likely they are able to influence change.
According to research done by Adams and Ferreira (2009), these authors also find a
correlation between gender diversity and performance. They measure performance through
Tobin’s Q, ROA, and standard deviation of monthly stock returns for five years. The data used is
from S&P 500, S&P MidCaps, and S&P SmallCap firms from the period of 1996 to 2003. Their
results suggest that firms perform worse with greater gender diversity. Further, they find that in
companies with strong rights for shareholders, greater gender diversity can be disadvantageous.
However, in companies where more monitoring is needed, gender diversity can have positive
effects (Adams & Ferreira, 2009). These results are consistent with the theory that woman
directors are tougher monitors. Similar to the study by Daunfeldt and Rudholm (2012), Adams
and Ferreira (2009) include firms of many different sizes in their sample. As discussed
previously, this could explain why results are different from other studies which find a positive
correlation because most of the other research focuses mainly on larger firms. This distinction is
important because the function and purpose of a board for a smaller organization can vary
greatly from that of a large publicly-traded corporation. The main difference is that smaller
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companies likely have fewer shareholders, while large boards have many more shareholders that
they are working to protect the interests of. In addition, the composition of these boards likely
tends to differ to account for these differences.
2.a.3 Inconclusive Outcomes
Obviously, there is not a clear answer to understanding the relationship between board
gender diversity and financial performance. To make matters more ambiguous, some studies
have found no significant relationship between board of director’s gender diversity and the
financial performance of firms. Noland et al. (2016) use a global survey of data from 21,980
firms and 91 countries. This study finds that the presence of women in corporate leadership
positions may influence firm performance. More specifically, female executive officers
demonstrate an impact. However, there is not sufficient evidence that female board members
impact firm performance. They suggest that having more women on boards may not directly
improve performance of the firm, but it may lead to greater inclusion of women in other
corporate leadership positions (Noland et al., 2016).
Another study conducted looks specifically at the gender quota enacted by Italy (Ferrari
et al., 2016). By analyzing the changes from before and after the quota was in place, they find no
significant impact on firms’ performance as boards became more gender diverse. The data
collected is from 2007 to 2014. The authors mention the conservative gender culture in Italy
which is slightly different than other European countries. This could potentially explain the lack
of change from the increased number of women on the boards. However, the study also finds that
the market positively receives the shift of boards as there is a positive effect on stock returns at
the date of board elections (Ferrari et al., 2016). Gender quotas introduce another layer for
analysis that studies in the United States do not have to consider. Also, cultural differences
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between Italy and the United States could also have additional effects. These reasons could
explain the different results of this study from others previously mentioned.
2.b Need for Further Research
There is not a clear consensus about what the impact is of having female board members.
Rhode and Packel (2014) analyze and provide a comprehensive overview of recent studies to
evaluate the business case for gender diversity on corporate boards. They conclude that the
relationship between gender diversity and corporate financial performance has not yet been
“convincingly established” (Rhode & Packel, 2014).
The mixed results can also be explained further through the application of more
theoretical perspectives. First, a few studies have addressed the limited number of women of
boards and whether their presence is an example of tokenism. If on many boards, a single woman
or the small number of women directors are viewed as a token, then this could inhibit the
influence that they are able to have over the board. Joecks et al. (2012) conducted research to
determine at which point a critical mass is established on boards. They find that three women (or
about 30% of the board) may be the “magic number” for women on boards of German firms.
After this point, firms tend to perform better (Joecks et al., 2012).
Similar evidence is found in Norwegian firms in a study by Torchia et al. (2011). In this
research, when a board shifts from two to three female directors, this increases the level of firm
innovation. This research suggests that, if in previous studies, few women were on the boards,
the results may change as women begin to make up a greater proportion of the board and reach a
critical mass. It has been established that board of directors are continuing to become more
gender diverse every year to this point. This reality suggests that further research should be
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conducted now that more boards may have a critical mass of at least three women serving on
them.
Many questions remain unanswered through the analysis of the existing literature.
Considering the contradictory nature of current research, lack of literature using recent data, and
the shift in the composition of boards of directors over time, there is a strong indication that
further research is necessary. This study aims to provide further clarity on this subject by using
more current data (from the time period of 2015 to 2019) because of the trend towards greater
gender diversity. It also considers two measures of gender diversity, both the percentage of
women and introduces the critical mass variable, in order to determine if tokenism and critical
mass theories can be applied to the results. Lastly, it will measure financial performance through
return on assets and return on equity financial ratios to be able to compare the results to previous
studies that have been conducted using the same metrics to see how these relationships may or
may not have shifted over time due to the change in the demographic composition of boards.
3. Methodology
Based on the objectives previously laid out, a model was developed to test the hypotheses
that increased gender diversity on boards improves firm financial performance measured by
higher ROA and ROE ratios. In addition, it is hypothesized that the presence of a critical mass of
at least three women on a board also improves ROA and ROE. The variables included in this
model are described in the next section.
3.a Variables
For this study, the main independent variable is board gender diversity. Two measures of
gender diversity were used. The first is the percentage of women on the board (the total number
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of female directors on the board divided by the total number of board members). This has been
widely used in previous studies as a way to measure gender diversity on boards. Data on board
members’ gender was manually collected from the board members’ profiles based on the
pronouns and titles used to describe them. If a board member was referred to as “he” or “his” or
had the title of “Mr.” they were counted as a male. Board members that were referred to as “she”
or “her” or had the title of “Ms.” or “Mrs.” were counted as female.
The second measure used is whether the boards had at least three women board members
(“a critical mass”). Boards with fewer than three women received a value of “0” while boards
with at least three women received a value of “1.” There is little existing research that considers
critical mass theory when looking at gender diversity on boards; most of the existing literature
focuses solely on the percentage of women on the board. This measure was included based on
the limited research conducted applying critical mass theory to board of directors by Joecks et al.
(2012), Erkut et al. (2008), and Torchia et al. (2011). The term critical mass is used to refer to
“any context in which things change after a certain number of people get together or enter a
setting” (Oliver 2014). It has been used in many settings when speaking about diversity –
including gender, racial, and ethnic diversity. In the research by Joecks et al. (2012), Erkut et al
(2008), and Torchia et al (2011), they all find that once a critical mass of three women has been
reached on a board, this is when there starts to be significant differences. Joecks et al. finds this
to be true with ROE in German firms, and Torchia et al. finds this relationship with firm
innovation in Norway.
The research by Erkut et al. differs in that it uses qualitative data, but it provides evidence
for the importance of a critical mass of women on boards. It states that “having three or more
women on a board can create a critical mass where women are no longer seen as outsiders and
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are able to influence content and process of board discussions more substantially” (Erkut et al.
2008). It helps create a dynamic that is more natural with less focus on gender. One woman that
participated in the study described it as, “One woman is the invisibility phase; two women is the
conspiracy phase; three women is mainstream” (Erkut et al. 2008). This study provides evidence
that gender diversity not only influences the board but that it also matters the number of women
that are present. Based on this research, the critical mass variable was included in order to
provide a more in-depth look at the ways in which gender diversity can influence boards.
The primary dependent variable used is firm financial performance which is measured
through two financial ratios. The ratios chosen are return on assets (ROA) and return on equity
(ROE). The return on asset ratio is found by taking net income divided by total assets. Return on
equity is calculated by taking net income over total equity. There are many ways to measure how
a company is performing financially; these metrics were chosen because they are consistent with
much of the prior research on this topic. They are also commonly used in other types of studies
and in the business world as measures of financial performance. Return on assets is a
measurement of how efficiently a company is using its assets to generate profit, while return on
equity considers how well a company’s investments from shareholders are being used to create
more income. While some studies use Tobin’s Q, ROA and ROE were used most often, so they
were the best option for comparability to the already existing literature.
A number of other variables were included as control variables at the firm and board
levels. The firm-level control used was firm size. This was computed by taking the log of a
firm’s total assets. All the firms in the sample tended to be fairly large due to their selection from
the S&P 500 Index. This is because the S&P 500 is made up of the largest publicly-traded
companies in the US. Despite this, there was still variability amongst the size of firms in the
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sample, and thus, this variable was included. The range for firm size was from 9.46 to 12.39 with
a mean of 10.45 and standard deviation of 0.56. The board-level controls used were board size
(the total number of directors on the board) and the average age of directors (sum of the ages of
all directors divided by the total number of directors). The mean board size was 10 members
with the minimum being 4 and maximum of 18. The standard deviation for board size was 2.49.
The average age variable ranged from 51.5 years to 71.67 years, with a mean of 64.82 and
standard deviation of 3.73. Dummy variables for year are also included to control for trends over
time that would impact revenues or costs for a firm.
These control variables were chosen because they were expected to have an impact on a
company’s ROA or ROE. They are also consistent with the literature on the subject. For each
variable chosen, data was collected for each year across the time period of 2015 to 2019. This
time period was chosen because it was the most recent complete data available at the time of the
data collection process. Previous studies varied in the length of time that data was collected, so
five years was chosen as a feasible choice when considering the manual nature of the data
collection process. A complete list of variables is included in Table 1 below.

Table 1
Descriptions of Variables

Variable

Symbol

Description

Year 2016

Y16

This is a dummy variable where if the data
was for the year 2016, the variable would
be “1,” otherwise it would be “0”.” This
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was included to control for trends relating
to the time period that could impact the
profitability of a firm.
Year 2017

Y17

This is a dummy variable where if the data
was for the year 2017, the variable would
be “1,” otherwise it would be “0”.” This
was included to control for trends relating
to the time period that could impact the
profitability of a firm.

Year 2018

Y18

This is a dummy variable where if the data
was for the year 2018, the variable would
be “1,” otherwise it would be “0”.” This
was included to control for trends relating
to the time period that could impact the
profitability of a firm.

Year 2019

Y19

This is a dummy variable where if the data
was for the year 2019, the variable would
be “1,” otherwise it would be “0”.” This
was included to control for trends relating
to the time period that could impact the
profitability of a firm.
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Board size

BS

The total number of directors on the board
or the sum of the total number of male and
total number of female directors.

Percentage of women

W

The percentage of women on the board is
calculated by taking the total number of
female directors on the board divided by
the total number of board members.

Critical Mass

CM

Boards with fewer than three women
received a value of “0” while boards with
at least three women received a value of
“1.”

Average age of board

A

The average age of the board was found by
taking the sum of the ages of all directors
divided by the total number of directors on
the board.

Firm size

S

This was computed by taking the logarithm
of a firm’s total assets.

Return on Assets

ROA

Return on Assets is calculated by taking
net income divided by total assets. ROA is
a measurement of how efficiently a
company is using its assets to generate
profit.
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Return on Equity

ROE

Return on equity is calculated by taking net
income over total equity. ROE is a
measurement of how efficiently a company
is using its equity to generate profit.

3.b Data Collection and Sample
Data for this study was collected for a sample of fifty firms randomly selected from the
S&P 500 stock market index. A full list of companies included in the sample is available in
Appendix A. The S&P 500 Index is widely used to gauge large-cap US equities and contains
companies listed on US stock exchanges only. Companies selected were listed on the index for
each period from 2015 to 2019. Data on each firm was collected over this period from the
Mergent Online database. Mergent Online provides information on publicly traded companies
including financial ratios, annual reports, and executive profiles. The final sample contains 250
data points and includes firms across different industries in the United States.
Table 2
Summarized Sample Data
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Variable

Obs.

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

Number of directors

250

10

2.49

4

18

Number of male

250

7.64

1.98

3

14

250

2.36

1.11

0

6

Percentage of women

250

23.26%

0.09

0%

45.45%

Critical Mass

250

0.39

0.49

0

1

Average age

250

64.82

3.73

51.5

71.67

ROA

250

6.48%

7.70

-36.06%

33.85%

ROE

250

19.89%

37.64

-101.12%

370.45%

Log(Firm size)

250

10.45

0.56

9.46

12.39

Board Characteristics

directors
Number of female
directors

Firm Characteristics

There are limitations of this sample that should also be addressed. The first being that only
firms with large market capitalizations were included. This is an area where future research on
this subject could be expanded. Data from smaller firms is not as readily available though, so
conducting research on smaller firms would be challenging. Secondly, there are potentially other
variables that could be used as control variables. Some studies used board independence, CEO
duality, multiple directorships, or tenure of board members as control variables. Data for these
variables was difficult to collect, as much of it is not required to be disclosed by companies, so
for the scope of this study, these variables were not included. There are also other characteristics
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of board members, boards, and firms that are difficult to quantify that could impact financial
performance. These include things such as corporate culture or the characteristics of specific
individuals. In addition, a few studies also controlled for reverse causality, that is, considering
that women may choose directorships at high-performing firms, or high-performing firms will
choose more women as directors than those that are not. The following table includes data to
describe the sample that was selected.
Since one of the main independent variables is whether or not a critical mass is present on
the board, data comparing boards with and without a critical mass is shown in Table 3. For
boards without a critical mass, the boards tended to be smaller. Also, these boards tended to have
older directors on average. The average ROA for boards without a critical mass was 6.35 while it
was slightly higher for boards with a critical mass at 6.68. Likewise for ROE, boards without a
critical mass had an average that was slightly lower at 19.84 whereas the average for boards with
a critical mass was 19.98. Based on these differences, it can be reasonably expected that the
critical mass variable will have an impact on how firms perform financially. Also, boards with
and without a critical mass seem to have somewhat different characteristics which may also play
a role in these differences.
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Table 3
Comparison of Firm Data With and Without a Critical Mass
Variable

No Critical Mass

Critical Mass

Average Total Number of Directors

9.07236842

11.43878

Average Age

65.2093525

64.23368

Average ROA

6.34960526

6.67551

Average ROE

19.8424941

19.97558

3.c Analysis of Data
Before the data was analyzed, it was prepared by checking for missing data points. A few
firms were found to have missing data for the financial ratios. For these data points, the ratios
were manually calculated using the financial data available within the Mergent Online database.
The data were then examined through regression analysis in Microsoft Excel and SPSS. This
study uses four models of regression.
Two of the models use the percentage of gender diversity variable with each measure of financial
performance (ROA and ROE).
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 𝐼: 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 (𝑅𝑂𝐴) = 𝐵𝑆 + 𝑊 + 𝐴 + 𝑆 + 𝑌16 + 𝑌17 + 𝑌18 + 𝑌19
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 𝐼𝐼: 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝑅𝑂𝐸) = 𝐵𝑆 + 𝑊 + 𝐴 + 𝑆 + 𝑌16 + 𝑌17 + 𝑌18 + 𝑌19
The other two use the critical mass variable with each measure of financial performance (ROA
and ROE).
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𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 𝐼𝐼𝐼: 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 (𝑅𝑂𝐴) = 𝐵𝑆 + 𝐶𝑀 + 𝐴 + 𝑆 + 𝑌16 + 𝑌17 + 𝑌18 + 𝑌19
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 𝐼𝑉: 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝑅𝑂𝐸) = 𝐵𝑆 + 𝐶𝑀 + 𝐴 + 𝑆 + 𝑌16 + 𝑌17 + 𝑌18 + 𝑌19
Lastly, the regressions were checked for multicollinearity. The results of the regression analysis
and collinearity diagnostics are discussed in the next section.
4. Results
Through the regression analyses, some significant relationships between variables were
found. Using model I, the regression indicated that there was a positive, significant relationship
between the percentage of women and ROA. This result is consistent with the hypothesis formed
during the creation of the model. Additionally, average age and firm size were negatively
correlated with ROA. These results were statistically significant at the 5% confidence level,
except for average age which was at the 10% confidence level. The full results are included in
Table 4 below. For the regression model II, which uses ROE as the dependent variable, there was
a negative relationship between the average age and firm size and ROE. The results were
statistically significant at the 5% confidence level. However, a statistically significant
relationship between the percentage of women and ROE was not established. This is
contradictory to the hypothesis that was established previously and was a surprising result to
find. The results of this regression model are again included in Table 4.
Table 4
Results from Models I and II (whether boards with greater percentages of women are more likely
to have higher ROA and ROE).
P-values that are statistically significant are noted with a *
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Variable

Predicted

Model 1a

Model 2a

sign

Coefficient

P-value

Coefficient

P-value

Board size

+

0.1073

0.6244

0.2127

0.8461

Percentage

+

11.6217

0.0444*

-9.2144

0.7491

Average age

-

-0.2543

0.0577*

-1.7797

0.0082*

Firm size

+

-4.0966

0.0000*

-11.3943

0.0165*

Year-16

+

0.4283

0.7731

3.8420

0.6052

Year-17

+

1.1138

0.4628

7.0367

0.3540

Year-18

+

0.7707

0.6226

4.7779

0.5421

Year-19

+

1.0886

0.5102

8.2058

0.3214

of women

Using Models III and IV, some relationships were found to be statistically significant
once again; however, critical mass was not significant with either ROA or ROE. The variables
that were found to have a negative relationship with ROA are average age and firm size. With
ROE, age and firm size also had a negative relationship. These results were again surprising, as it
was hypothesized that the critical mass variable would have a positive relationship with both
ratios. The regression results for Models III and IV are included in Table 5.
Finally, the results of the collinearity diagnostics found there to be no issues of
multicollinearity with each of the models used. Based on these results, the p-values in the Tables
4 and 5 can be considered reliable.
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Table 5
Results from Models I and II (whether boards with a critical mass are more likely to have higher
ROA and ROE).
P-values that are statistically significant are noted with a *
Variable

Predicted

Model 3a

Model 4a

sign

Coefficient

P-value

Coefficient

P-value

Board size

+

0.0006

0.9978

0.1254

0.9135

Critical

+

1.2355

0.2737

1.6452

0.7692

Average age

-

-0.2917

0.0284*

-1.7192

0.0095*

Firm size

+

-3.7577

0.0001*

-12.1661

0.0091*

Year-16

+

0.5954

0.6897

3.5777

0.6295

Year-17

+

1.3383

0.3787

6.6606

0.3784

Year-18

+

1.0070

0.5212

4.2802

0.5835

Year-19

+

1.4788

0.3694

7.4272

0.3648

Mass

After considering the full sample without removing any data points, the data was
truncated to exclude the 2% largest and 2% smallest values for both ROA and ROE. The 2%
trimmed means are presented in Table 6. Before trimming, the standard deviation for return on
equity was 37.64% with a range from -101.12% to 370.45%. This spread is very large and may
include firms not necessarily operating under normal conditions. In addition, when looking at the
firms excluded, all five from the lowest 2% happen to be firms from the utility industry. This
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may indicate an underlying industry-wide issue rather than performance issues of individual
boards. If this is the case, this would not be indicative of normal conditions, and it would be
important to consider the data without these outliers that lower the mean ROE for the sample. On
the other hand, ROA had a mean of 6.48% before truncation and a range from -36.06% to
33.85%. The standard deviation was 7.70. This sample seemed less likely to have outliers which
were extreme in nature and considered abnormal; however, the same method for trimming was
also used for ROA and considered for consistency. After truncation, this excluded ten boards
from the data, so there were 240 data points contained in each sample. The four models of
regression were run again with the new set of data.
Table 6
2% Trimmed Means of ROA and ROE
Variable

2% Trimmed Mean

ROA

6.5575

ROE

20.7762

The additional regression results varied somewhat from the original results. Under model
I, a positive relationship was still found between the percentage of women on the board and
ROA. The p-value was more significant than the one found previously. These results meet the
expectations formed in the hypothesis. In addition, firm size was found to have a negative
relationship with ROA at the 1% confidence level. For the regression including ROE (Model II),
the coefficient for the percentage of women changed from negative to positive, and the p-value
became significant at a 1% confidence level. These results are more aligned with the results that
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were hypothesized and indicate that there is a relationship between ROE and board gender
diversity. In addition, there was a negative relationship between firm size and ROE. The results
for these regression models are shown in Table 7.
Table 7
Results from Models I and II (whether boards with greater percentages of women are more likely
to have higher ROA and ROE) using truncated data which excludes the smallest 2% and largest
2% of ROA and ROE.
P-values that are statistically significant are noted with a *
Variable

Predicted

Model 1b

Model 2b

sign

Coefficient

P-value

Coefficient

P-value

Board size

+

-0.1998

0.2562

-0.4416

0.4348

Percentage

+

10.8213

0.0175*

38.6238

0.0095*

Average age

-

-0.1551

0.1420

0.0600

0.8638

Firm size

+

-2.8704

0.0002*

-6.4117

0.0079*

Year-16

+

0.8063

0.4980

4.5530

0.2341

Year-17

+

1.2312

0.3023

0.7224

0.8511

Year-18

+

-0.0659

0.9574

1.4220

0.7197

Year-19

+

0.4118

0.7523

2.6563

0.5235

of women

The regressions that include the critical mass variable also yield varying results from
what was found before trimming for outliers. As mentioned previously, there was no significant
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relationship established between the critical mass variable and either ROA or ROE. When model
3 was applied using the trimmed data, the same result was found. No association could be drawn
between ROA and critical mass. Again, this was not the result that was hypothesized for this
model. There were two significant variables in this model, though. Average age and firm size
had a negative relationship with ROA. Model IV, on the other hand, found a positive and
significant relationship between ROE and critical mass at the 1% confidence level. This result
aligns with the hypothesis that was formed in the methodology section and indicate that a critical
mass does matter on boards. The results for Models III and IV are shown in Table 8.
Table 8
Results from Models I and II (whether boards with critical masses are more likely to have higher
ROA and ROE) using truncated data which excludes the smallest 2% and largest 2% of ROA and
ROE.
P-values that are statistically significant are noted with a *
Variable

Predicted

Model 3b

Model 4b

sign

Coefficient

P-value

Coefficient

P-value

Board size

+

-0.2886

0.1239

-1.0613

0.0748*

Critical

+

0.9676

0.2824

8.0673

0.0049*

Average age

-

-0.1924

0.0678*

-0.0237

0.9447

Firm size

+

-2.5154

0.0008*

-6.0554

0.0103*

Year-16

+

1.0031

0.4025

4.9893

0.1901

Year-17

+

1.4638

0.2229

1.2633

0.7408

mass
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Year-18

+

0.1797

0.1448

1.8268

0.6422

Year-19

+

0.8265

0.6347

3.2452

0.4299

5. Evaluation of Results – Implications and Areas for Further Research
This section of the thesis will evaluate the results that were explained above. It will also
discuss the implications of these results and provide direction for future research on this subject.
The results from model I confirm the previous research which finds a positive
relationship between return on assets and board gender diversity such as the study by Erhardt et
al. (2003). Considering the data for the Erhardt et al. (2003) study was from 1993 to 1998, these
new results indicate that as boards have become more diverse, this positive relationship
continues to hold true. Similarly, Carter et al. (2010) also found a positive relationship between
financial performance and board gender diversity, but they measure financial performance in
terms of Tobin’s Q. Still, this builds an even stronger case for the inclusion of women on boards
and their impact on financial performance if the impact on financial performance can be
measured via varying metrics.
In contrast, the results laid out in this paper find a relationship that opposes prior research
from Vemala et al. (2018). Similar to this research, their sample consists of firms from the S&P
500; however, the primary difference is that their sample is from 2000 to 2011. This suggests
that as boards become more gender diverse this relationship will become increasingly
established. Other research from Daunfeldt and Rudholm (2012) also found a negative
relationship with ROA and the percentage of women on a board. This research is different in that
it uses Swedish firms and includes firms of all sizes, rather than just large companies. Similarly,
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Adams and Ferreira (2009) also use a sample which includes firms from the S&P 500, S&P
MidCaps, and S&P Small Cap firms. As mentioned previously, the sample used for this research
was limited to firms from the S&P 500 which only includes large, publicly-traded companies.
Based on the contrasting results found, more current research including smaller and mid-sized
firms should be conducted to understand whether a shift has occurred in the relationship between
ROA and the performance of firms of differing sizes.
When considering model III, there has been no previous research which considers the
relationship between ROA and critical mass. However, these results indicate that a critical mass
may not be necessary for female board members to influence a firm’s ROA. This means that just
one or two female board members impacted firms’ ROAs, rather than needing a critical mass of
three women present on the board.
Considering the models that include ROE, the results from model II confirm the research
by Vemala et al. (2018) which also finds a positive relationship between ROE and board gender
diversity. Much of the other literature does not address the impact of the percentage of women
on ROE. Though there was limited research which considers critical mass theory, the study by
Joecks et al. (2012) was the primary basis for adding the critical mass variable to this research.
The results found from Model IV find the same results that Joecks et al. (2012) do. Considering
the lack of research that accounts for critical mass, this is a significant finding. The results from
both of these models combined with earlier research make a strong case for the importance of
female board members in impacting ROE, especially for the inclusion of a greater proportion of
women on boards.
Overall, these results should encourage the election of more female board members, as it
would be a smart business decision to help improve important financial ratios for the company.
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While the results suggests that just one or two women can impact a company’s ROA, there is no
compelling reason not to have more women than that on the board. A negative relationship was
not found between ROA and critical mass, meaning it would not hurt companies to have three or
more women serving on their board. In addition, having at least three women on the board could
also help improve companies’ ROEs. While this research is promising in building a business
case for the inclusion of women on boards, there are limitations to the applications of the current
literature.
As mentioned previously, one important area for further research would include smaller
and mid-sized firms. One of the challenges of completing this type of research is that data for
these firms is not as widely available; however, this is an area where the current literature is
lacking. Another gap in the existing literature is the consideration of the intersection of different
identities when discussing diversity. The sole focus of much of the current research is on gender
diversity or racial diversity. These two types of diversity intersect to shape the experiences of
board members. Although some of the current literature in this area considers both of these types
of diversity, they often do not consider how these variables impact one another. Further, there is
no research which considers other pieces of identity such as sexual orientation and ability status.
As boards shift to become more gender diverse, they are likely becoming more diverse in other
ways as well, and the role that this plays in firm performance would be interesting to consider.
Once again, this sort of research would be difficult to perform at this time due to the lack
of available data. This may change in the near future, however. The Nasdaq stock exchange has
proposed a standardized disclosure framework that would require all companies listed on this
exchange to follow certain disclosure rules (“Nasdaq,” 2020). It would also require boards to
have at least two diverse directors, “including one who self-identifies as female and one who
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self-identifies as either an underrepresented minority or LGBTQ+” or explain why they do not
(“Nasdaq,” 2020). This is similar to the German “comply or explain” policy that was referenced
earlier. In the research by Joecks et al. (2012), the researchers find that as these policies have
been put into place, and boards are consisting more frequently of critical masses of women, ROE
has improved for German firms. Based on the similar findings in this research which also
indicates a positive relationship between ROE and critical mass, but within firms in the United
States, the policy suggested by the Nasdaq may be effective in achieving greater diversity whilst
positively impacting firms. This type of reform could also be adopted by the New York Stock
Exchange to promote diversity efforts more broadly in the United States.
The US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) still has to approve the proposal,
however. The passage of this plan would be a significant step in increasing transparency relating
to the demographics of board members in the United States. This would not only allow for
improved and more in-depth research on this subject, but it would also improve the information
available to consumers and shareholders. This is significant in that it would allow shareholders to
make more informed decisions when electing board members, and consumers would have the
opportunity to demonstrate their preferences for companies that choose to embrace diversity at
the board level through their buying behaviors. In a time when diversity and inclusion efforts
have become of increased concern for companies in the United States, this research further
promotes the importance of these efforts.
It also makes a distinction between simply having diverse boards and working towards
the inclusion of diverse board members as demonstrated by the confirmation of the critical mass
variable’s relationship with ROE. This application of critical mass theory promotes the idea that
firms must go beyond performative actions for diversity and inclusion. They must work to treat
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their diverse employees as more than tokens and create settings that are more equitable and
inclusive, where women and those in other generally underrepresented groups will no longer face
the phenomenon of being the only person in the room like them. Finally, more diverse corporate
boards have the potential to create more equitable opportunities at every level of firms and better
alignment with the various stakeholders of firms including customers and employees. As boards
of directors become more diverse, there is potential to spark changes that are much broader
reaching than the improvement of an individual firm’s financial performance.
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Appendix A: Companies Included in Sample
Companies Included in Sample
Company Name

Exchange:Ticker

Industry

3M Company

NYSE:MMM

Industrial Conglomerates

Adobe Inc.

NasdaqGS:ADBE

Application Software

Agilent Technologies, Inc.

NYSE:A

Life Sciences Tools and Services

Akamai Technologies, Inc.

NasdaqGS:AKAM

Internet Services and Infrastructure

Alexion Pharmaceuticals, Inc.

NasdaqGS:ALXN

Biotechnology

American Electric Power

NasdaqGS:AEP

Electric Utilities

AmerisourceBergen Corporation

NYSE:ABC

Health Care Distributors

Aon Plc

NYSE:AON

Insurance Brokers

Apple Inc.

NasdaqGS:AAPL

Technology Hardware, Storage and

Company, Inc.

Peripherals
Applied Materials, Inc.

NasdaqGS:AMAT

Semiconductor Equipment

AvalonBay Communities, Inc.

NYSE:AVB

Residential REITs

Bank of America Corporation

NYSE:BAC

Diversified Banks

BlackRock, Inc.

NYSE:BLK

Asset Management and Custody
Banks

Boston Properties, Inc.

NYSE:BXP

Office REITs

Brown-Forman Corporation

NYSE:BF.B

Distillers and Vintners

CarMax, Inc.

NYSE:KMX

Automotive Retail
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Carnival Corporation & Plc

NYSE:CCL

Hotels, Resorts and Cruise Lines

CenterPoint Energy, Inc.

NYSE:CNP

Multi-Utilities

Chevron Corporation

NYSE:CVX

Integrated Oil and Gas

Costco Wholesale Corporation

NasdaqGS:COST

Hypermarkets and Super Centers

CVS Health Corporation

NYSE:CVS

Health Care Services

Delta Air Lines, Inc.

NYSE:DAL

Airlines

Devon Energy Corporation

NYSE:DVN

Oil and Gas Exploration and
Production

Expedia Group, Inc.

NasdaqGS:EXPE

Internet and Direct Marketing
Retail

FirstEnergy Corp.

NYSE:FE

Electric Utilities

FMC Corporation

NYSE:FMC

Fertilizers and Agricultural
Chemicals

Ford Motor Company

NYSE:F

Automobile Manufacturers

General Electric Company

NYSE:GE

Industrial Conglomerates

Hess Corporation

NYSE:HES

Oil and Gas Exploration and
Production

HP Inc.

NYSE:HPQ

Technology Hardware, Storage and
Peripherals

Humana Inc.

NYSE:HUM

Managed Health Care

Intuit Inc.

NasdaqGS:INTU

Application Software

Jacobs Engineering Group Inc.

NYSE:J

Construction and Engineering

Kimberly-Clark Corporation

NYSE:KMB

Household Products
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L3Harris Technologies, Inc.

NYSE:LHX

Aerospace and Defense

Lumen Technologies, Inc.

NYSE:LUMN

Alternative Carriers

McDonald's Corporation

NYSE:MCD

Restaurants

Mohawk Industries, Inc.

NYSE:MHK

Home Furnishings

Molson Coors Beverage Company

NYSE:TAP

Brewers

News Corporation

NasdaqGS:NWSA

Publishing

NIKE, Inc.

NYSE:NKE

Footwear

NVIDIA Corporation

NasdaqGS:NVDA

Semiconductors

O'Reilly Automotive, Inc.

NasdaqGS:ORLY

Automotive Retail

Sealed Air Corporation

NYSE:SEE

Paper Packaging

The Kroger Co.

NYSE:KR

Food Retail

The TJX Companies, Inc.

NYSE:TJX

Apparel Retail

Tyson Foods, Inc.

NYSE:TSN

Packaged Foods and Meats

Under Armour, Inc.

NYSE:UAA

Apparel, Accessories and Luxury
Goods

Walmart Inc.

NYSE:WMT

Hypermarkets and Super Centers

Whirlpool Corporation

NYSE:WHR

Household Appliances
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Appendix B: Results of Truncation at 5%
This appendix is included to show the results of trimming the data to exclude the largest 5% and
smallest 5% for ROA and ROE. This removes 24 boards from each sample, leaving a sample of
226 data points versus 250 in the full sample and 240 in the previously truncated sample. This
makes the sample significantly smaller. Utilizing this set of data, the results from Model I
shifted. The relationship between the percentage of women and ROA was no longer significant,
although it remained positive. The results for ROE remained somewhat similar when compared
to the other set of trimmed data. Again, a positive relationship was established between both the
percentage of women and critical mass variables. These results were significant at a 5%
confidence level. As mentioned previously, a stronger case can be made to trim the data in the
sample used for ROE than with ROA. This could explain the differences in the results from the
ones established previously. The results for Models I and II using this set of data is included in
Table B1, and the results from the regressions using Models III and IV are included in Table B2.
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Table B1
Results from Models I and II (whether boards with greater percentages of women are more likely
to have higher ROA and ROE) using truncated data which excludes the smallest 5% and largest
5% of ROA and ROE.
P-values that are statistically significant are noted with a *
Variable

Predicted

Model 1c

Model 2c

sign

Coefficient

P-value

Coefficient

P-value

Board size

+

-0.2507

0.1060

-0.5082

0.2887

Percentage

+

1.8915

0.6509

28.1896

0.0297*

Average age

-

-0.1497

0.1092

0.0364

0.9028

Firm size

+

-2.0027

0.0036*

-3.1594

0.1252

Year-16

+

0.6538

0.5364

0.7594

0.8142

Year-17

+

1.6944

0.1148

1.1973

0.7118

Year-18

+

1.0522

0.3377

0.9783

0.7702

Year-19

+

1.1931

0.3035

3.5734

0.3095

of women
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Table B2
Results from Models III and IV (whether boards with critical masses are more likely to have
higher ROA and ROE) using truncated data which excludes the smallest 5% and largest 5% of
ROA and ROE.
P-values that are statistically significant are noted with a *
Variable

Predicted

Model 3c

Model 4c

sign

Coefficient

P-value

Coefficient

P-value

Board size

+

-0.2361

0.1454

-0.9749

0.0532*

Critical

+

-0.3321

0.6795

5.7517

0.0182*

Average age

-

-0.1621

0.0776*

-0.0168

0.9543

Firm size

+

-1.8151

0.0067*

-2.8533

0.1551

Year-16

+

0.7090

0.5014

1.2160

0.7048

Year-17

+

1.7894

0.0943*

1.6109

0.6163

Year-18

+

1.1680

0.2848

1.3572

0.6831

Year-19

+

1.3553

0.2373

4.0743

0.2405

Mass
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